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Abstract This article rethinks the concept of the “British World” by paying close atten-
tion to the voices of those who attended the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Confer-
ence. They identified not one, but three different kinds of British world space. Mapped,
respectively, by ideas and emotions, by networks and exchange, and by the specific sites
of empire, this article suggests that, in the light of criticisms the British World concept
has faced, and in the context of recent scholarship on the social and material production
of space, this tripartite approach might offer a useful framework for British and imperial
historians interested in the history of the global.
Standing in the lecture theater at Burlington House in July 1903 for the firstAllied Colonial Universities Conference, the Liberal member of Parliamentand historian James Bryce announced that the meeting was designed to
facilitate cooperation between “the universities of the British world.”1 In doing so,
he articulated a concept that since the late 1990s has animated historians seeking
to recover the connections linking the countries “set going” by migration from
Britain. Pursued mostly by British imperial historians and scholars from the
former Dominions, this British World project flowered in the early 2000s, resulting
in a series of conferences and publications. However, a decade after its inception, the
movement reached something of an impasse, beset by definitional imprecision and
criticized for its inattention to questions of power. Nonetheless, in the last few
years, a number of books have emerged that again invoke the concept, utilizing it
as a way of explaining the origins and processes of globalization. The appearance
of these works suggests that it is time to reevaluate the utility of the idea of the
British World.
This article rethinks the concept of the British World by paying close attention to
the voices of those who attended the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Conference.
At this meeting, the delegates identified not one, but rather three different kinds of
British world space. Mapped, respectively, by ideas and emotions, by networks and
exchange, and by the specific sites of empire, they pointed to the imagined, material,
and local British worlds that reflected their lived experience of the globalizing connec-
tions of the period. This article argues that, in the context of recent scholarship on the
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social and material production of space, this tripartite approach might offer a useful
framework for British and imperial historians interested in the history of the global.
THE FLOWERING AND FLOUNDERING OF THE BRITISH WORLD PROJECT
The idea of the British World emerged at the end of the 1990s, advanced by imperial
historians and scholars from the former Dominions who wished to take up the
history of the settler societies’ connections with Britain.2 This, they argued, was a
story that had been abandoned in the second part of the twentieth century. Influenced
by feminism, postwar migration, decolonization, and social history, national histor-
ians had instead turned their attention to questions of domestic power and privilege,
charting the demise of British sentiment as part of what was sometimes cast as “an
inevitable process of national self-realisation.”3 The story of settler connection was,
moreover, also one that British World historians claimed was being neglected by
the “new imperial historians,”who at the time were reframing the writing of imperial
history in Britain. Influenced by developments within postcolonial theory, these
scholars saw culture as a site of power and argued that constructions of race,
gender, class, and sexuality had to be seen as “grammars of difference” that mutually
shaped the lives and identities of both colonized and colonizer.4 Although the
members of the group that organized the first British World conference in London
in 1998 were attracted to the new imperial historians’ call to see metropole and
colony together within a single analytic frame, they criticized this scholarship for
having “virtually nothing to say about the encounters millions of British migrants
had with earlier generations of people who were curiously very much like themselves
but also quite different.”5
Instead, these historians looked back to J. G. A. Pocock’s call in 1973 to integrate
into a “new British history” the then largely separate narratives being told about
Scotland, Ireland, and England, on the one hand, and the equally separate stories
being told about the Dominions, or “neo-Britains,” on the other.6 Citing the writings
of commentators such as J. R. Seeley, Charles Dilke, and J. A. Froude, the group
pointed out that the British World was not only a concept that they had developed
at the end of the twentieth century but also one that, in the form of discussion
about Greater Britain or closer imperial union, was employed by scholars who
lived and wrote in the nineteenth. The “expansion of Britain and the peopling and
2 For an overview of the origins of the project, see Phillip A. Buckner, “Introduction: The British
World,” History of Intellectual Culture 4, no.1 (2004): 1–4.
3 Stuart Ward, “Sentiment and Self-Interest: The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial
Culture,” Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (April 2001): 96.
4 Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, “Introduction: Being at Home with the Empire,” in At Home with
the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (New York,
2006), 19; Catherine Hall, “Culture and Identity in Imperial Britain,” in The British Empire: Themes and
Perspectives, ed. Sarah E. Stockwell (Malden, MA, 2007), 202.
5 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World,” in The British World: Diaspora,
Culture and Identity, ed. Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich (London, 2003), 2.
6 J. G. A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge, 2005), 22; Bridge and
Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World,” 6. See also J. G. A. Pocock, “Conclusion, Contingency, Iden-
tity, Sovereignty,” in Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith J.
Stringer (London, 1995), 297.
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building of the trans-oceanic British world”was, argued Carl Bridge and Kent Fedor-
owich in the volume that emerged from the 1998 meeting, at the heart of the late
nineteenth-century vision of the imperial enterprise.7
The mass migration of people from Britain was therefore central to the British
World agenda. This phenomenon was indeed of immense proportions. It is esti-
mated that in the century after 1815 approximately 22.4 million people left the
British Isles, with another 3 million emigrating between 1920 and 1950. Until the
turn of the century, the majority went to the United States, with a minority
heading to the settler colonies. After 1900, however, this balance shifted, with
most of those who left Britain between 1900 and 1950 settling within the British
Empire.8 This massive demographic expansion not only shaped the lives of those
who migrated from Britain but also had tragic consequences for the indigenous
and preexisting communities of the lands in which they settled. Indeed, examination
of indigenous and subaltern histories—together with research on the conflict and
decimation colonialism brought, and the resistance and contestation it inspired—
has been among the most important work undertaken by national historians in the
former Dominions in the last thirty years. However, while they recognized the sig-
nificance of this work, Bridge and Fedorowich argued that settler societies were not
only shaped by “grammars of difference” marked out and measured on the frontier
and in contexts of contest and rule. Rather, they contended that these communities
were also part of a shared British World held together by what they called a common
“cultural glue.” Extended along the routes of migration, this common culture “con-
sisted not only of sentiment and shared institutional values but also of a plethora of
networks.”9
Therefore, British World scholars have focused on the real and imagined common-
alities that connected settler communities.10 In particular, they have examined a
shared sense of Britishness, which they argue united people who lived in these
regions.11 Although this was an identity that was most strongly held by British
migrants and their descendants, historians who have taken up the British World
concept suggest that it also functioned as a capacious category that could be locally
adapted and embraced by those whose roots were not in the British Isles, including
many nonwhites.12 For these scholars it was this shared but contested culture that was
the real glue of the British Empire, a “glue” that explains the survival of notions of a
7 Bridge and Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World,” 11.
8 M. A. Jones, “The Background to Emigration from Great Britain,” inDislocation and Emigration: The
Social Background of American Immigration, ed. D. Fleming and B. Bailyn (Cambridge, MA, 1974), 33–
34; Stephen Constantine and Marjory Harper,Migration and Empire (Oxford, 2010); Charlotte Erickson,
Invisible Immigrants: The Adaptation of English and Scottish Immigrants to Nineteenth-Century America
(London, 1972).
9 Bridge and Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World,” 6.
10 Ibid.
11 Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre, ed., Britishness Aborad: Transnational
Movements and Imperial Cultures (Melbourne, 2007).
12 For example, see Donal Lowry, “The Crown, Empire Loyalism and the Assimilation of Non-British
White Subjects in the British World: An Argument against ‘Ethnic Determinism,’” Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 31, no. 2 (May 2003): 96–120; Saul Dubow, “How British Was the British World?
The Case of South Africa,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37, no. 1 (March 2009): 1–27.
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British World well into the 1950s.13 Themes of migration, common culture,
and shared identity therefore undergirded the British World idea, and it was these
three themes that constituted the focus of the meetings—in Cape Town in 2002,
Calgary in 2003, Melbourne in 2004, Auckland in 2005, and Bristol in 2007—
held in the wake of the initial 1998 London conference. Edited volumes arising
from these meetings have been published, and numerous article-length studies and
a handful of monographs have appeared.14
But since its initial flowering, the British World approach has encountered a
number of difficulties. To begin with, it has struggled with a lack of definitional
clarity. Indeed, as Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis wrote in their introduction
to the edited volume that emerged following the 2003 Calgary meeting, “[T]he
founders of the British World project were never unified in their interpretation of
what should be included within [its] . . . framework.”15 Yet after ten years its
spatial and temporal boundaries still remained unclear. To what extent did the
notion of the British World account for relations between Britain and Catholic
Ireland, French Canada, or Afrikaner South Africa? What about the Straits
Chinese, India, or Latin America? Or, indeed, the United States—a relationship
that latterly, in the form of Atlantic World scholarship, has an older and detailed his-
toriography?16 After all, in the nineteenth century, these were places to which British
migrants had also traveled and settled. Similarly, although there seemed agreement
that the British World demised in the 1960s, questions regarding its chronology
also remained unanswered. Alert to these issues, the Calgary conference sought to
address questions of inclusion and membership, while the final 2007 Bristol
meeting explicitly sought to map and define what was meant by the concept. Yet
these events raised more questions than they solved, and a clearer framework has
not emerged.
This definitional uncertainty highlights a methodological difficulty the project had
faced from its beginnings. For, although the editors of the British World volumes
13 Phillip A. Buckner, “Introduction: The British World,”History of Intellectual Culture 4, no. 1 (2004),
3; A. G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” Past & Present 200 (August 2008): 211–47.
14 Bridge and Fedorowich, The British World; Phillip A. Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., Redisco-
vering the British World (Calgary, 2006); Phillip A. Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., Canada and the
British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity (Vancouver, 2006); Darian-Smith, Grimshaw, and Macin-
tyre, Britishness Abroad; Phillip A. Buckner and Carl Bridge, “Reinventing the British World,” Round Table
368 (January 2003): 77–88; Simon J. Potter,News and the BritishWorld: The Emergence of an Imperial Press
System, 1876–1922 (Oxford, 2003); Bill Nasson, Britannia’s Empire: Making a British World (Stroud,
2004); Keith Jeffery, “The Road to Asia, and the Grafton Hotel, Dublin: Ireland in the ‘British
World,’” Irish Historical Studies 36 (November 2008): 243–56; John Griffiths, “Were There Municipal
Networks in the British World, c1890–1939?” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37 (Decem-
ber 2009): 575–97; Tamson Pietsch, “Wandering Scholars? Academic Mobility and the British World,
1850–1940,” Journal of Historical Geography 36 (October 2010): 377–87; Katie Pickles, “The Obvious
and the Awkward: Postcolonialism and the British World,” New Zealand Journal of History 45, no. 1
(April 2011): 85–101; Arthur Downing, “The Friendly Planet: ‘Oddfellows,’ Networks, and the
‘British World,’ c.1840–1914,” Journal of Global History 7, no. 3 (November 2012): 389–414.
15 Buckner and Francis, Rediscovering the British World, 18.
16 David Armitage, “Greater Britain: A Useful Historical Category?” American Historical Review 104,
no. 2 (April 1999): 427–45; Frank Thistlethwaite, The Anglo-American Connection of the Early Nineteenth
Century (Philadelphia, 1959); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, The British Atlantic World, 1500–
1800 (Basingstoke, 2002); Jack P. Greene and Phillip D. Morgan, Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal
(Oxford, 2009).
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placed an emphasis upon shared culture and identity, much of the work they collected
tended to remain rooted in particular regional or national constituencies. Indeed,
much British World scholarship has been more concerned with the importance
that the British connection had for various national communities than it has been
focused on a British World conceived of as a whole. The articulated goal of Philip
Buckner and Douglas Francis’s Canada and the British World, for example, was “to
re-examine a complex phenomenon and to understand how it shaped the world in
which Canadians lived and to some extent still live.”17 With some notable excep-
tions—Simon Potter’s News and the British World (2003) in particular stands out—
British World scholarship has for the most part proceeded through comparison
and juxtaposition.18 Paradoxically, this hesitancy in joining the particular with the
general has also meant that, despite their attention to provincial examples, British
World case studies have tended to underplay the complications of local conditions
and the contested politics of specific colonial identities. At the same time as it
focuses on regional Britishness, British World scholarship can also seem to take set-
tlers out of their specific colonial contexts and pass over the weight of local colonial
entanglements.19
Underpinning both these issues is an inherent fuzziness about the mechanisms at
the heart of British World connections. Although its proponents speak about “net-
works,” with the exception of Potter’s book, British World scholarship has neither
traced their operation nor attended to the systems and institutions that created, sus-
tained, and conditioned them. It has had little to say about how the British World fits
within the formal and informal processes historians normally associate with British
imperialism and little to say about its relationship to the wider transnational networks
linking actors across the globe. Beyond its stated desire to “recover” the story of con-
nections with the settler colonies, the project lacks a convincing conceptual or theor-
etical reflection of its historiographic contributions.
This absence has left the British World concept poorly placed to engage with the
robust bodies of work that have emerged in the last fifteen years on settler colonial-
ism, imperial cultures, whiteness, and race—all of which touch on its concerns in
some way.20 Indeed, by “restoring British settlers to a central role in empire build-
ing,” some historians have argued that the British World idea neglects the “virulently
racist contribution [of these settlers] to the shaping of colonial discourses and
17 Buckner and Francis,Canada and the British World. The work of historians seeking to recover the role
that the various national groups from within the United Kingdom played in the story of Britain’s empire
might also be seen in this light. See Aled Jones and Billie Jones, “TheWelsh World and the British Empire,
c 1851–1939,” in Bridge and Fedorowich, The British World; James Watson, “English Associationalism in
the British Empire: Yorkshire Societies in New Zealand before the First World War,” Britain and the World
4 (March 2011): 84–108.
18 Potter, News and the British World.
19 For example, see Tony Ballantyne, “Thinking Local: Knowledge, Sociability and Community in
Gore’s Intellectual Life, 1875–1914,” New Zealand Journal of History 44 (October 2010): 138–56.
20 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8
(December 2006), 387–409; Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Basingstoke,
2010); Hall and Rose, “Introduction: Being at Home with the Empire”; Ruth Frankenberg, White
Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis, 1993); Alastair Bonnett, White
Identities: Historical and International Perspectives (Harlow, 2000); Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds,
Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality
(Cambridge, 2008).
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practices.”21 As Saul Dubow has pointed out, some critics have even suspected that
the project “is merely a dressed up form of the old imperial history, or worse, that it
recalls the racially inflected nineteenth-century vision of ‘Greater Britain.’”22 Phillip
Buckner and Douglas Francis have rejected such claims, arguing that the movement
was not a lament for a lost world but rather an attempt to understand a complicated
phenomenon that had been neglected by imperial historians.23 But in accentuating
the shared culture and identity of settler communities and their connections with
Britain, the British World approach can be seen to have de-emphasized the uneven
nature of power relations, both within these societies themselves and between
British settlers and those cast as their racial, ethnic, and religious “others.” This ten-
dency to flatten out fissures and frictions, and to focus on Britishness, has worked to
obscure the ways such identities helped to normalize the practices of settler colonial-
ism, while simultaneously sidelining issues of power, access, difference, and contest
within colonial societies and overlooking the complex lateral interconnections
between the settler, commercial, and dependent parts of Britain’s empire.
Finally, despite its stated interest in culture and identity, the BritishWorld approach
has seemed reluctant to engage with scholarly developments emerging under the
aegis of the “new cultural” and the “new political” history.24 This has, to be sure,
involved a distancing of itself from the new imperial historians’ interest in otherness
and difference. But it has also entailed a lack of any explicit interaction with the turn,
in the past two decades, to consideration of the complex ways in which meanings are
constructed, received, and sustained, not just, as Jay Smith writes, “by semiotic
context but also by the collective and value-laden assumptions of the people who con-
stitute society.”25 Such attention to the produced nature of meaning involves concern
as much with the multiple ways in which meanings were debated and contested as
with the ways they were established. In the case of the new political history, this
means examining not only states and political organizations but also the cultures
of politics that helped constitute them. In the face of these criticisms, a decade
after its inception, British World scholarship seemed to have stuttered to a halt.
However, in advancing the idea of a British World that stretched between dis-
persed parts of the globe, these historians were in many ways wrestling with the
same problem that since the late 1990s had been animating scholars across the huma-
nities and social sciences and forcing them to reconsider the way they thought about
21 Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,”History Compass 4,
no. 1 (January 2006): 130.
22 Dubow, “How British Was the British World?”, 2. Dubow is perhaps referring to Tony Ballantyne’s
contention that the “use of ‘Britishness” as an analytical apparatus not only marks a return to C.W. Dilke’s
celebration of Britishness and empire but also is an impoverished and reductive model for the history of
multiethnic and polyglot colonial societies for removed from the United Kingdom. See Tony Ballantyne,
Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke, 2001), 3.
23 Buckner and Francis, introduction to Rediscovering the British World, 18–19.
24 Aletta Biersack and Lynn A. Hunt, eds., The New Cultural History (Berkeley, 1989); Lawrence Black,
“‘What Kind of People Are You?’ Labour, the People, and the ‘New Political History,’” in Interpreting the
Labour Party: Approaches to Labour Politics and History, ed. John Callaghan, Steven Fielding, and Steve
Ludlam (Manchester, 2003), 23–38.
25 James Epstein, “Introduction: NewDirections in Political History,” Journal of British Studies 41, no. 3
(2002): 255–58; Jay M. Smith, “No More Language Games: Words, Beliefs, and the Culture of Early
Modern France,” American Historical Review 102, no. 5 (December 1997): 1439.
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their disciplines. This was the problem of increasing global connection—its origins
and growth, its limitations, and its consequences. Indeed, it is an attempt to under-
stand the workings and development of globalization that in the last few years has led
scholars to again turn their attention to the history of mass migration from Britain.
From Niall Ferguson to James Belich, several historians have argued that this outflow
of people was a key driver of global connection.26 Gary Magee and Andrew Thomp-
son have seen it as a force that shaped economic activity, while Duncan Bell and David
McIntyre have understood British settler societies as central to political ideas that
sought to make sense of a changing geopolitical landscape.27 Together, the appearance
of these works suggests that the time is ripe to revisit the concept of the British World
in the light of the criticisms it has faced and examine its utility for scholars seeking to
understand the history of empire and its relationship to the global.
This article begins this undertaking by drawing on recent scholarship associated
with the social and material production of space. It argues that just as geographers
have come to understand space not as a fixed entity that we move through but
rather as something that gets made by people and their contexts, so historians of
Britain and its empire need to think not of a singular British World but rather of mul-
tiple, produced British world spaces: we need to think not only about the places in
which people lived but also about the networks and exchanges that shaped their
lives and the emotions and feelings that created internal landscapes of longing and
belonging.28 These were British worlds that stretched in directions that sometimes
but not always overlapped; worlds that warped and shaped each other, fashioning
uneven transnational realms that were global but by no means universal. Conceptua-
lizing these British “worlds” offers historians a way of thinking about the limited,
affective, and often exclusionary spaces that characterized and still characterize globa-
lization. Indeed, this article suggests that if we pay attention to the voices of those
who at the turn of the twentieth century spoke about the “British world”—people
who themselves were experiencing the changes brought about by dramatic new
forms of global connection—we find them talking in just this way.
NETWORKS AND THE SPACES OF GLOBAL CONNECTION
Cognizant of contemporary globalization, in the last fifteen years scholars from a
wide range of disciplines have begun to think more broadly about the transnational
26 Ferguson calls it “Anglobalization”; Belich, the “settler revolution.”Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and
Demise of the BritishWorld Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York, 2003); James Belich,Replenishing
the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford, 2009); JohnDarwin,The
Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge, 2009).
27 Gary Bryan Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalization: Networks of People, Goods and
Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914 (Cambridge, 2010); Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain:
Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton, NJ, 2007);W. DavidMcIntyre, The Britannic
Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907–48 (Basingstoke, 2009).
28 A key work here is Edward W. Soja, “The Socio-spatial Dialectic,” Annals of the Association of Amer-
ican Geographers 70, no. 2 (June 1980): 207–25, in which Soja argued that “social and spatial relations are
dialectically inter-reactive, interdependent.” See also E. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of
Space in Critical Social Theory (London, 1989); Doreen Massey, For Space (London, 2005); Michael J.
Dear and Steven Flusty, eds., The Spaces of Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography (Oxford, 2002).
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and global connections of the modern world. In particular, they have pointed to the
importance of various kinds of networks in moving people, products, and infor-
mation around the globe.29 Historians of the British Empire have enthusiastically
adopted this “network approach,” seeing the extension of new communications
and transportation technologies such as steamships and undersea telegraph cables
in the second part of the nineteenth century as especially important both in building
transnational identities and in forging colonial rule.30 Indeed, attention to networks
has been a feature of British World scholarship. But, as noted above, much of this
work emphasized the integrative nature of networks and highlighted the extent to
which they flattened out other kinds of distance, bringing settler communities into
close connection with Britain.
The networks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, were
—like those of today—contingent things. They stretched across space, but not all
space; they connected people, but not all people; they burst into life, but they also
died. As Simon Potter has argued, “Patterns of long-distance mass communication
in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century British Empire were influenced by particu-
lar institutions and marked by an unevenness and a tendency towards systematization
that shaped the nature and the extent of connections between different parts of the
world.”31 The questions we need to ask when we consider networks must, therefore,
focus on the nature of these contingencies, on the factors and processes that shaped
them, and on their consequences.32 They must focus on the unequal ways networks
were used, on who employed them, and for what multiple and conflicting ends, and
they must address the ways in which networks changed over time. If networks of
trade, communication, and transportation brought far-flung parts of the world
into close connection with each other, they did so in a highly uneven manner.
These transnational networks and the connective infrastructures that facilitated
them shaped the ways people experienced space and the ways in which they under-
stood it. If the life of a particular community was dependent upon connection with
places remote to it—as Sandip Hazareesingh has shown the port of Glasgow was tied
up with Bombay, for example—then in very real ways those places and the people
who lived in them were brought close together, becoming interdependent in ways
that remade alignments of proximity and distance.33 Similarly, the transportation
29 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford, 1996); Ann L. Stoler and Frederick Cooper,
“Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures
in a Bourgeois World, ed. Ann L. Stoler and Frederick Cooper (Berkeley, 1997); Saskia Sassen,Globalization
and Its Discontents (New York, 1998); Saskia Sassen, ed.,Global Networks, Linked Cities (New York, 2002).
30 John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Cambridge, 1995), 8.
For the importance of networks to imperial history, see Christopher A. Bayly, Empire and Information:
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge, 1996); Alan Lester,
“British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire,” History Workshop Journal 54, no. 1 (Autumn
2002): 24–48; Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race, 12, 195; Simon J. Potter, “Webs, Networks and
Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire,”
Journal of British Studies 46, no. 3 (July 2007): 621–46.
31 Potter, “Webs, Networks and Systems,” 622.
32 Charles Maier in Ian Tyrrell, “Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory
and Practice,” Journal of Global History 4, no. 3 (November 2009): 467; Simon J. Potter, “Empire, Cultures
and Identities in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain,” History Compass 5, no. 1 (January 2007): 58.
33 Sandip Hazareesingh, “Interconnected Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as
Modern Global Ports, c. 1850–1880,” Journal of Global History 1, no. 4 (March 2009): 7–31.
448 ▪ PIETSCH
of people, goods, and ideas along these routes shaped the feelings and emotions of
individual men and women. Longing for home, anxiety about the future, and
anger at poor treatment fashioned personal spaces that, although interior, intersected
with and acted upon the circulating material world just mentioned. Both these spaces
in turn helped form the localities in which people lived and the sites through which
goods traveled—the docks, the woollen mills, and the interiors of homes; what
people ate, how they voted, and where they spent their money.
This is what geographers mean when they talk about the social and material pro-
duction of space. For historians unfamiliar with this work, David Harvey’s tripartite
definition is perhaps a helpful place to begin. Harvey talks about three kinds of space:
absolute, relative, and relational. According to him, absolute space is bounded and
immovable. It is space as we might commonsensically understand it—locatable, mea-
surable, and fixed. In contrast, relative space is the space of processes and motions. It
is the space “of transportation relations and of commodity and monetary circula-
tion”—a space that can be mapped differently depending on whether we are measur-
ing cost, time, type of commodity, or mode of travel.34 Finally, relational space is the
space that lives inside us—the space produced by our experiences, memories, fears,
and dreams. It is a space that is difficult to measure, in which identity is fluid and
multiple.35 According to Harvey, none of these frames alone is sufficient to explain
the world and people’s experience of it. Rather, they exist in tension with each
other: “[W]e are inexorably situated in all three frameworks simultaneously,
though not necessarily equally so.”36
Harvey first put forward these ideas in 1973, seeing such reflections on the nature
of space as crucial to understanding the inequalities and injustices of “urban processes
under capitalism”—not only do social relations shape space, he argued, but planners
seek spatial forms that will shape social behavior.37 To buttress this contention that
we live in a world produced in a myriad of complex ways, Harvey placed his tripartite
division of space alongside Henri Lefebvre’s own threefold understanding.38 Space,
Harvey wanted to make clear, is always a complex of relational, relative, and absolute
aspects. This assumption is central to his argument that global capitalism works by
distancing itself from the relational ways—lived, felt, dreamed, and imagined—in
which humans experience space and instead seeks to operate solely within the
realms of absolute and relative space—the spaces of trade and exchange.39
Arguments such as these have particular resonance for historians interested in the
relationship between mass migration and the workings of globalization in the late
34 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York, 2009), 135. See also
“Space as a Key Word,” in David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: Toward a Theory of Uneven Geographi-
cal Development (London, 2006), 119–48.
35 Harvey, “Space as a Key World,” 128.
36 Ibid., 277.
37 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London, 1973); Harvey, “Space as a Key Word,” 120.
38 Lefebvre speaks about (1) material space (spaces as experienced through our sense perceptions), (2)
the representation of space (the way we conceive and represent this world of experienced sense percep-
tions), and (3) what he calls the “spaces of representation” (the way we live in and through the spaces
we perceive and conceive). For Lefebvre, then, space is inherently imbued with the traces of the processes
that produced it. See Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom, 141–65.
39 Eric Sheppard, “David Harvey and Dialectical Space-Time,” in David Harvey: A Critical Reader, ed.
Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Oxford, 2006), 121–41.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for this was a period in which the world was
becoming connected in new kinds of ways. From the 1840s railways began to stretch
across continents, and from the 1860s steam-powered ocean vessels crossed the
Atlantic. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, by the 1880s steam
ships had taken over the longer-range routes to Australasia and East Asia as well, dra-
matically reducing both the time and the cost of travel. The transatlantic crossing,
which had formerly taken thirty days, now took as little as ten; the trip to Australia
fell from three months to one; and the voyage from London to Bombay was halved.
Freight prices dropped by 90 percent.40 Meanwhile, from the 1860s, undersea tele-
graph cables connected Britain to India and North America, and from the 1870s to
Australasia as well. These routes not only enabled people, information, and goods to
move around the world in larger numbers than ever before but also brought far-away
places deep into domestic cultures. Yet they did so in ways that were highly uneven.
At the same time as the new connective infrastructures linked some parts of the
world, they also created fresh alignments of exclusion and isolation. In addition,
although the new kinds of transport and communication reshaped some of the
older “global” worlds fashioned by religion, trade, and language, they never
wholly penetrated or replaced them. To understand the worlds created by Victorian
globalization, we need to attend to the absolute, relative, and—most important—
relational spaces in which contemporaries lived. We need to consider how they
experienced the new imperial and global connections of the period and the ways
they sought to make sense of them.
THE BRITISH WORLDS OF THE 1903 ALLIED COLONIAL UNIVERSITIES
CONFERENCE
The proceedings of the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Conference offer a good
opportunity to take up these questions. The history of the connections among the
universities of the British Empire is a subject that has so far been curiously neglected
by historians of education and imperialism alike.41 Yet, like the international scientific
congresses and traveling meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science (which have attracted considerable attention), the history of academia offers
scholars a way of examining the relationships between culture, knowledge, and
empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.42
Founded in the middle of the nineteenth century, many of the universities in India,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa predated the establishment of the
English civic or redbrick institutions. However, while those on the subcontinent
were set up by British officials (as, later, were those in Africa), the universities in
what would become the Dominions were founded by self-confident settler elites
40 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth
Century (New York, 1981), 167; Belich, Replenishing the Earth, 108.
41 I take up these connections in detail in Tamson Pietsch, Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and
the British Academic World, 1850–1939 (Manchester, 2013).
42 For example, see RoyMacLeod and Peter Collins, eds., The Parliament of Science: The British Association
for the Advancement of Science, 1831–1981 (Northwood, 1981); Charles Withers, Geography and Science in
Britain, 1831–1939: A Study of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Manchester, 2010).
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who saw these institutions as both symbols of colonial maturity and disseminators of
European civilization in the colonies. Drawing their staff predominantly from the
United Kingdom, since the 1880s these settler institutions had sought to cultivate
closer ties with British scholarship, sponsoring traveling scholarships for their gradu-
ates and leave of absence schemes for their staff, and employing appointment pro-
cesses that plugged their academics into British networks. Universities both in
Britain and in the settler colonies accorded official recognition to the “British aca-
demic world” these scholarly ties created by granting preferential standing to each
other’s degrees. Yet despite these various informal connections, until 1903 there
had been no attempt to bring together representatives of the universities of the
empire.
In fact, the initiative for the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Conference came
not from the universities but from the Canadian novelist and Conservative
member of the Parliament of the United Kingdom for the constituency of Gravesend
(in Kent), Sir Gilbert Parker. In November 1902, having attended a dinner in
London for graduates of Trinity University, Toronto, Parker decided to host a
similar dinner for all colonial university graduates resident in England.43 But in
the heady political climate that erupted following the tariff reform speech delivered
in May 1903 by his fellow Conservative parliamentarian Joseph Chamberlain,
Parker’s event offered the possibility of embodying the very kind of imperial union
both wished to promote.44 What began as a dinner for colonial graduates therefore
grew to resemble an Edwardian imperial convention, complete with the round of
parties and “inevitable dinner[s]” such an event usually entailed.45 Like other imper-
ial groups that, at the turn of the century, turned to the idea of sentimental union in
the wake of the failure of imperial federation, the 1903 conference sought to institute
schemes that would foster what it saw as the already existing cultural and ideological
affinity between Britain and the settler colonies.46 Education was a common focus of
these groups, and the Imperial Studies Group (c. 1887), the Victoria League (1901),
and the League of the Empire (1901) all emerged in this period. However, although
the 1903 conference must be seen in this context of the concern with Greater Britain
that Duncan Bell has suggested grew as a response to the contemporary anxieties
about social and economic decline in Britain, it instigated a movement for university
association that has endured.47 Followed by the Congresses of the Universities of the
British Empire, held in 1912, 1921, and then every five years throughout the inter-
war period, the movement found permanent institutional form in the Universities
Bureau (now the Association of Commonwealth Universities), which kept an
office in London.48
43 Letter concerning the Allied Colonial Universities Dinner, fromE. N. Fere and L. C. R. Arnott (Hon.
Secs.), 15 January 1903, Registrar’s Correspondence, Series 200, 1903/156, University of Adelaide
Archives.
44 Bryce, in “Official Report,” 77. See also Pietsch, Empire of Scholars, 94–99.
45 “The Allied Colonial Universities Conference,” The Times, 13 July 1903, 9.
46 James Greenlee, “The ABCs of Imperial Unity,”Canadian Journal of History 14, no.1 (April 1979): 49.
47 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton,
2007).
48 For more on the 1903 conference, the congresses and the Universities Bureau see Tamson Pietsch,
“‘Mending a Broken World’: The Universities and the Nation, 1918–36,” in Brave New World: Imperial
and Democratic Nation-Building in Britain between the Wars, ed. L. Beers and G. Thomas (London,
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The 1903 conference is a useful case study because, as institutions that were rooted
in specific social and political communities and yet were also agents of “universal”
culture and scholarship, universities and those who worked in them were especially
conscious of their place at the nexus of the local and the global. The imperial rhetoric
of the 1903 meeting tells us much about the ways those who lived along the routes of
empire understood their world. It reveals participants’multiple, limited, and overlap-
ping notions of the British world and shows them articulating various notions of
space that echo Harvey’s tripartite division.
Material Connection
Conference delegates articulated a British world linked by material connections—a
British world fashioned in what Harvey would call relative space. As F. H. Chase,
a professor of divinity at the University of Cambridge, asserted at the start of the
meeting, “These universities are already connected. We have not to create an affinity
between them.”49 Participants—who included politicians, educationalists, and aca-
demics from across Britain and the British settler empire, all of whom were men—
identified a community made by tangible ties that linked those working in colonial
universities to each other and to their colleagues in Britain: “We are bound up
with each other,” said Thomas Harrison of the University of New Brunswick, “the
younger with the older Universities.”50
Mostly loudly asserted in 1903 was the reality of what was called “interchange”—
the movement and circulation of students and staff between universities. “Already we
have a considerable interchange of professors,” declared James Bryce in the opening
session.51 Sir Henry Roscoe, former vice-chancellor of the University of London,
agreed. He assured the meeting that he could “give a long list of scholars who are
now distinguished, who hold professorships in various parts of the Empire.”52
Indeed, the lives of many of the delegates at the conference were themselves testa-
ment to academic migration. A large contingent of them had traveled from Britain
to academic positions in various colonies. As the University of Sydney’s Theodore
T. Gurney noted, his institution had “on its staff graduates of almost every univer-
sity.” The careers of men like Samuel Alexander, Grafton Elliot Smith, and Ernest
Rutherford were cited as examples of the migration of scholars from the New
World to the Old.53 Similarly, conference participants were also quick to point out
that there was a considerable circulation of colonial students. For example, Dyce
Duckworth from Edinburgh boasted that he represented “a University which is
know[n] for many years to have opened her doors perhaps more largely to Colonial
students than any other in the three Kingdoms.”54
2011), 161–80; Tamson Pietsch, “Out of Empire: TheUniversities’ Bureau and the Congresses of the Uni-
versities of the British Empire, 1913–1939,” in Universities for a “New World”: A Commonwealth of Knowl-
edge and Skills, 1913–2013, ed. D. Schreuder (Sage, forthcoming 2013).
49 “Official Report,” 78.
50 Ibid., 117.
51 Ibid., 74.
52 Ibid., 85.
53 Ibid., 95, 101.
54 Ibid., 111, 113–14.
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In addition to the movement of people, the conference participants also high-
lighted the movement of objects in the form of examination papers. Chase spoke
of the Cambridge system of local examinations, in which entrance exams could be
sat in designated centers around the empire.55 H. Dean Bamford from the University
of New Zealand spoke of his institution’s practice of selecting the “foremost men in
England” to “set and correct” its examinations, the papers for which were shipped
over to Britain each year, while Principal W. Peterson from McGill University high-
lighted his institution’s policy of “holding, for some years past, matriculation exam-
inations in London.”56 “[A]s a matter of fact,” declared Richard Threlfall
representing Sydney, “[i]f we look it up we shall find that it is already possible for
any student to go to any other University that gives privileges.”57 The conference
delegates knew that this movement of people and objects between the universities
of Britain and the settler world connected places that physically were located far
apart. But they also knew that these material networks extended to certain insti-
tutions and not others: for the most part, teachers did not travel to the United
States; exam papers were not sent to Germany; and colonial students went mostly
to Edinburgh, Oxford, Cambridge, and London.58 For the delegates in 1903 this
was a kind of British world that already existed—one mapped by the tangible
flows of material connection. Its borders, its centers, and its peripheries were deter-
mined not by political boundaries or physical distance but rather by the relative
movement of people, exam papers, and regulatory policies.
An Imagined Community
But the conference participants’ personal experience of movement along the routes of
this relative British world led many of them to imagine another kind of British world
—one marked out in what Harvey would call relational space. Those who attended
the meeting placed a strong emphasis upon their feelings of affinity. Bryce opened the
meeting by talking about the “identity of thought and feeling, a like attachment to
those glorious traditions which link us to the past, a like devotion to those ideals
which we have to pursue in the future.”59 The educational reformer and Liberal imperi-
alist R. B. Haldane spoke of a “common sentiment,” while Peterson in Canada alluded
to the “feeling of brotherhood” that pervaded the room.60 Responding to their own
experience of relocation, to anxieties about British decline, and to their feelings of
belonging, in different ways the delegates imagined a British world that extended
out beyond the confines of the British Isles.
Like many of their contemporaries, the conference participants imagined this
British world as a community defined by race. F. H. Chase from the University
of Cambridge spoke of the “unity of race, unity of language, unity of character,
and . . . unity of religious ideas,” while the Conservative prime minister Arthur
Balfour boasted of the “British people throughout the world” as a “community of
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 81, 113.
57 Ibid., 103.
58 Pietsch, “Wandering Scholars?”
59 “Official Report,” 77.
60 Ibid., 80, 118.
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blood.”61 According to Haldane, it was a racial community with very particular
characteristics: “We have got the splendid energy of our race,” he proclaimed, “we
have got the power which is ours, in a unique degree, of adapting ourselves to
new conditions, of overcoming difficulties which to others might even seem to be
insurmountable.”62 Given this racial imagining, it is perhaps unsurprising to find
that the Indian universities were not invited to the 1903 meeting and that the
laws, literature, and energy that Haldane saw as native to the “British peoples”
were portrayed as “foreign to the East.”63
However, if the British world was to be imagined as a racial community, where did
that place the United States? It was, after all, a country to which large numbers of
British people had migrated, but it stood outside the bounds of the British Empire
and by the turn of the century was emerging both as a direct global and economic
challenge to British supremacy and as a potential complementary power. For the
1903 conference participants, the United States stood as a testament to the energy
and vitality of the British race, but it also constituted a threat to it. On the one
hand, they spoke of the United States as part of an Anglo or English-speaking
world, and on the other, they talked about it as a rival to a more narrowly conceived
British community.64
Alongside this racially demarcated community, conference participants also ima-
gined an educational world that was part of the larger world of “universal” scholar-
ship: “No jealous tariffs stand between the free communication of ideas,” argued
Balfour at the 1903 meeting, “[a]nd surely we may be happy that that is the
fact.”65 Yet despite these cosmopolitan pronouncements, the delegates nonetheless
marked out a special British sphere within the international community of scholars.
As Balfour continued:
though knowledge is cosmopolitan, though science knows no country and is moved by
no passions not even the noblest passion of patriotism still I do think that in the methods
and machinery of imparting knowledge, as there always has been in modern times, so
there should still continue to be some national differentiation between the centres of
knowledge which reflects the national character and suits the individual feeling, and
that . . . an English-speaking student and a citizen of the Empire from whatever part
of the world he may hail, ought to find something equally suited to him as a student,
and more congenial to him as a man, in some university within the ample bounds of
the Empire.66
Chase spoke of the universities as “sisters,” Peterson called them “fellow-workers,”
and Manchester’s Alfred Hopkinson argued that the British universities at home
and abroad were part of “one great commonwealth in learning and in science.”67
With F. B. Jevons, the subwarden of the University of Durham, they looked “forward
61 “Official Report,” 122.
62 Ibid., 119.
63 Ibid., 72.
64 Haldane, in ibid., 119.
65 Ibid., 124.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 78, 83, 109.
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to a time when there shall be one corporation of learning throughout the whole British
Empire.”68
At the 1903 conference, these severally imagined British worlds were expressions
of the feelings of connection to which delegates repeatedly testified. They overlapped
and spilled into each other, and their boundaries were neither wholly consistent nor
especially well defined. Often they were deeply contested. These imagined British
worlds frequently drew on the conceptual apparatus of other imagined worlds (of
which a more broadly conceived empire, religious community, global “Scottishness,”
and sense of cosmopolitan internationalism were just some) or defined themselves in
opposition to rival configurations (such as republican nationalism or international
socialism) borrowing as well as lending their ideational power. But together they
point to the various ways in which individuals at the turn of the century conceived
of a British world that was an idealized union—a community of sentiment and
feeling that existed in their heads and in their hearts.
Local Variations
Third, the 1903 conference participants spoke of a British world of numerous and
divergent local sites—sites we might understand within Harvey’s frame of absolute
space. Chase, for example, knew that “inherited tradition” was “modified in the
light of experience” to create “many types of universities” and that “the type of a uni-
versity is largely determined by its previous history and by its environment.”69 For
him, and for his fellow delegates, there were many local British worlds, characterized
by “differences of type.”70 As Haldane explained, “[T]he soil, the climate, the tastes
of the people, yes, and the commercial aspirations of the people . . . these are the root
and source of much of the energy which is thrown into education [and t]hese aspira-
tions, varying in different places, all tend to give a different complexion—a different
intellectual complexion—to the University feeling in each locality.”71 In many ways
the delegates saw this heterogeneity as a source of strength. “We must co-operate,”
suggested Oliver Lodge, “not by uniformity, but rather by the opposite, by differen-
tiation.”72 The proposal was for what the conference organizers called “specialis-
ation.”73 “My dream,” announced Haldane, “is to see this great British nation in
its different parts, with its great common constitution, co-operating for a common
end, but co-operating with the developments which are peculiar to the soil and to
the branches of the people.”74
Despite these professions of cooperation, however, delegates knew that heterogen-
eity did not mean equality. This was demonstrated clearly by the exclusion of the
Indian universities and also drawn out by the comments of several representatives
at the meeting. Some noted that, although colonial universities gave full recognition
to degrees from universities in Britain, Oxford and Cambridge only gave one year’s
68 Ibid., 116.
69 Ibid., 79.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 117
72 Ibid., 93.
73 Ibid., 79.
74 Ibid., 118.
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credit to graduates of colonial universities—and then only to some of them.75
“[T]here was . . . a suspicion,” suggested Sydney’s Richard Threlfall, “that the stan-
dard of some Colonial Universities was not as high as the standard of Universities in
[England].”76 Neither was it just colonial universities that had difficulties with
Oxford and Cambridge. Oliver Lodge, principal of the University of Birmingham,
found it galling that the degrees of his university were not recognized either.77 But
perhaps it was John Watson from Queen’s University in Ontario who expressed
this sense of regional variation best when he explained that “you come to realise
much more fully and forcibly what it is to belong, or not to belong, to an Empire
when you come from a Colony than when you are at home. . . . [I]t makes quite a
difference to stand at the circumference and to stand at the centre when you are con-
sidering a question of Empire.”78 With his fellow delegates, Watson recognized the
divergent local variants of British universities in the settler colonies. His comments
point to another type of British world—one in which the imagined communities
and material connections noted above manifested in ways specific to the various
absolute sites and locations of British settlement.
The participants at the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Conference knew there
was not just one kind of British world. They asserted its existence as a material
reality, articulated it as an idea and a feeling, and acknowledged and incorporated
its local variations. Intimately familiar with the new connective infrastructures of
the period, they searched for ways to give expression to their own experience
of them. They knew that there was a world mapped by the relative movement of
people and objects; they knew there were internal relational worlds made by their
own feelings, memories, fears, and dreams; and they knew that in various absolute
sites of the settler world, these material and imagined worlds combined in different
and specific ways.
As we have seen, the delegates who attended the 1903 meeting understood these
worlds as British. Indeed, in many ways the Allied Colonial Universities Conference,
and the whole Greater Britain movement, constituted an attempt to bring these
various British worlds together and make them, in the words of F. H. Chase, “effec-
tive for practical purposes.”79 This was a project that was—at the conference as more
broadly— ultimately destined to fail. But its lack of success should not blind histor-
ians to the multiple configurations of lived experience it sought to combine. For it
was the means by which the 1903 delegates and many of their contemporaries
sought to make sense of the uneven and limited forms of global connection that
shaped their own lives.
Crucially for the delegates, as for Harvey, the multiple British worlds that framed
their lives could not be separated. Migrants moved in and out of local communities,
bringing with them not only relative flows of objects, goods, and money, but also
their various hopes and anxieties, which in turn took on different forms in different
places. Moving people acted to enshrine the worlds they imagined, in turn exerting
influence over the extension of relative connections and shaping relational cultures
75 See Pietsch, Empire of Scholars, 90–94.
76 Ibid., 102.
77 Ibid., 91.
78 Ibid., 109.
79 F. H. Chase, in ibid., 78.
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that affected not only those who saw themselves as British but also those against
whom Britishness was defined—people for whom empire meant something very
different indeed. The British worlds concept is useful for historians because it pro-
vides a way of talking about the multiple and intersecting yet necessarily limited
worlds that long-distance connections created.
POSSIBILITIES
Much British World scholarship already implicitly recognizes this framework. Work
on migration, for example, is key to understanding the British world of relative con-
nections, while Lisa Chilton’s study of female emigration promoters and Ged
Martin’s examination of the idea of imperial federation invoke imagined and rela-
tional British worlds. Meanwhile, Schreuder andWard’sAustralia’s Empire and Buck-
ner’s Canada and the British World clearly address the local manifestations of
Britishness in different settler communities.80 Making the British worlds framework
explicit, however, brings a number of benefits.
First, it permits a more precise understanding of what we might think of as the
British World, highlighting the extent to which its boundaries depend on what
we measure. There were multiple British worlds: the relative worlds mapped by
the movement of goods and people between Britain and parts of the world that
looked primarily to it; the relational worlds made by the not always compatible ima-
gined visions of a common racial, linguistic, or cultural British or Anglo-Saxon com-
munity; and the local and situated worlds, enshrined and expressed in various places
across the globe. Perhaps these worlds overlapped most in the settler colonies of
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent South Africa, but they
never did so wholly or even exclusively, and they extended variously in other direc-
tions. This approach gives us a way to think about people and communities within
the United States, Argentina, British Malaya, and other places outside the Domin-
ions, which we might understand as being part of some of these British worlds
but not others.81 But it also makes space for those aspects of the history of the
Dominions that do not fit this framework and for their specific and local character.
This in turn makes it possible to think about a British worlds chronology. We can
chart the making and unmaking of the connective institutions, racial imaginings,
and local sites that helped constitute British world spaces, and we can pinpoint trans-
formations brought to them by events such as war, economic depression, and the
advent of new technologies.
Second, by seeing these British worlds as species of the relative, relational, and
absolute spaces made by different kinds of global connection, this framework
places the notion of the British World alongside and in tension with the other
ways of navigating global space that emerged in the late nineteenth century. In
80 Lisa Chilton, “A New Class of Women for the Colonies: The Imperial Colonist and the Construction
of Empire,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 31, no. 2 (May 2003): 36–56; Ged Martin,
“The Idea of ‘Imperial Federation,” in Reappraisals in British Imperial History, ed. Hyam and Martin
(London, 1975), 121–39; Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward, Australia’s Empire (Oxford, 2008);
Buckner and Francis, Canada and the British World.
81 Robert A. Bickers, ed., Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas (Oxford, 2010). For an earlier
period, see Miles Ogborn, Global Lives: Britain and the World, 1550–1800 (Cambridge, 2008).
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different ways, anticolonial nationalism, international socialism, and pan-Arabism
might all be seen as means by which contemporary actors sought to understand
and respond to the forces of Victorian globalization. As the excellent work of
many historians has recently shown, the advent of railways, the telegraph, steam
ships by the 1870s and 1880s, and the political and economic possibilities and con-
sequences they entailed affected people of all kinds from many places.82 If the notion
of an expansively framed British World was a way that many Britons at home and
abroad (and possibly some non-Britons as well) sought to make sense of these
changes, others looked to different notions of global community in this period.
The comments of J. A. Hobson in 1906 provide a good example. He noted that
with the facilitation of travel and of news, the world had become “as large as we
by our practical experience and our imaginative experience and sympathy choose
and are able to make it” and argued that this “practical enlargement of the world”
should lead, not to imperialism, but rather to democratic internationalism.83
Third, this framework provides a way of talking about power and inequality, both
within the British settler world and also more broadly. For it is at the intersection of
the material, imagined, and local worlds of countless people that the uneven land-
scapes of global connection and the unequal cultures of empire and colonial
society were and are made. These worlds acted on and refashioned each other in a
variety of different ways, distorting the free movement of goods, forging ideas and
identities and cultures of rule, and producing sites and societies with specific charac-
ters and tendencies. Thinking in this way might bring the notion of British worlds
into conversation with work on gender, race, and class, work on violence, and
work on the various regimes of legislation and control (and resistance to them)
that also characterized the making of the modern world.
The 1903 conference delegates were well aware that the various British worlds
they apprehended intersected. Their consciousness casts light on existing scholarship
and illuminates possibilities for future work. First, the 1903 delegates knew that the
movement of people and objects between universities was fashioned by both senti-
ment and self-interest. Imagining themselves as part of an expansive British commu-
nity, the universities of the settler colonies looked almost exclusively to Britain for
their staff and for their educational models, but they adapted these and refashioned
them to meet the particular needs of local communities. This interplay between the
local and the imagined in turn conditioned the material traffic of staff, students, and
syllabi.84 As historians, we need to ask questions about the ways in which the relative
spaces of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century globalization that were marked out
by the movement of commodities, manufactured goods, news, material culture,
money, and people were shaped and warped by globalization’s local and relational
82 For example, see Chris Bayly, The Birth of the ModernWorld, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Com-
parisons (Oxford, 2004); Tony Ballantyne, Between Colonialism and Diaspora: Sikh Cultural Formations in
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spaces: the particular character and needs of situated communities and the imagined
worlds of their inhabitants.
We can see the importance of this question in two studies that consider the limited
nature of imperial networks. In his book on the distribution of news in the British
Empire, Simon Potter has shown how the high cable charges set by private telegraph
companies “acted to modify and in many ways limit the impact” of the benefits in
speed they brought, creating “patterns of interconnection that were quite different
in nature from the unstructured, diverse, competing, and somewhat chaotic imperial
webs and networks” of the first part of the nineteenth century.85 This happened,
Potter argues, because local newspapers banded together to extract more favorable
rates from the international news agencies that sold news content to multiple subscri-
bers. In the case of the British Empire, it was Reuters that dominated. The emer-
gence of these alliances worked to regulate and significantly limit the variety of
news circulating around the “imperial press system,” advantaging those countries
such as Australia and South Africa that operated effective cartels and disadvantaging
others in Africa and East Asia that did not.86 In the case of the imperial press,
“[i]nstitutional agglomerations of power” in the form of business interests acting
upon their need to meet the demands of specific local markets were crucial factors
that shaped and restrained relative networks of communication.87
Where Potter sees institutional interests as important in shaping networks of com-
munication, Magee and Thompson argue that cultural factors such as coethnic ties of
trust were crucial in shaping economic behavior in the British Empire. They point
out that long-distance trade was a risky thing: costs were high andmarkets unpredict-
able, while differences in language, culture, and legal systems all hindered the flow of
goods. But professional and family networks helped overcome these risks and
obstacles—providing privileged entry into colonial markets and facilitating what
Magee and Thompson call an “informational asymmetry” in which the stock of
knowledge among London investors was heavily biased in favor of the British
settler colonies.88 The quality and supply of information, argue Magee and Thomp-
son, shaped decision making, and information flowed more easily along the coethnic
networks extended by migration from Britain. For these reasons, they say it is necess-
ary to talk of a “cultural economy.”89 The work of Potter and Magee and Thompson,
describes the particular and uneven ways in which communication and economic net-
works were limited by local and affective (including ethnic and racial) factors.
Second, the 1903 delegates also knew that when they articulated the British world
as an imagined community, they did so because of their own experience of empire
and the feelings it entailed. “I am a graduate of Glasgow University, but I have
been in Canada for thirty years,” declared Watson. “I know something about the
feeling in the Old Country, and I know something about the feeling in the
Colony.”90 Indeed, the delegates from Canada were particularly anxious to foster a
British identity in order to ward off the menacing presence of the United States,
85 Potter, “Webs, Networks and Systems,” 631, 633. See also Potter, News and the British World.
86 Potter, “Webs, Networks and Systems,” 636.
87 Ibid., 634.
88 Magee and Thompson, Empire and Globalization, 170.
89 Ibid., 14.
90 “Official Report,” 109.
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which, according to McGill’s principal, Peterson, had already “spoilt Canada of many
students.”91 If we are to understand contemporaries’ internal worlds of anxiety and
hope, fear and memory—with all their implications for cultural, political, and econ-
omic life—we need to think about the ways that the relational spaces they inhabited
were made by their particular lived experiences of the globalizing world of the late
nineteenth century.
We can see this approach underpinning Duncan Bell’s work on Victorian political
thought. He views the emergence of the idea of Greater Britain in the late nineteenth
century as a response to two connected factors: “fear about increasing international
competition, both economic and geopolitical, and anxiety about the potentially dele-
terious consequences of democratic reform.”92 These were both concerns that grew
out of the new forms of global connection, including the expansion of industrial
capitalism at home and abroad, that were changing the world in the Victorian
period. According to Bell, the idea of Greater Britain assuaged these fears by, on
the one hand, promising the creation of a federation to rival that of Germany and
the United States and, on the other, offering the means by which the diseased and
endangered British body politic might be regenerated in the healthy colonies. J. A.
Froude, for example, writing in 1870, saw the white colonies as an extension of Brit-
ain’s land mass: a vast area to which the English could transfer “without ceasing to be
Englishmen” and where they could recover the character and the physical vitality
through connection with the land that had made Elizabethan England great.93 For
Bell, then, ideas about a white Greater Britain were responses to fears and anxieties
brought home by the new kinds of global connection of the period.
But we might also see the imagined British world as the product of individuals’
feelings about their own travels along the routes of empire and their experiences in
its various sites and cities. This included feelings of loss and longing attendant
upon their own migration or that of their loved ones. For Britons who migrated
abroad, the idea that the settler colonies were part of an expansive British community
could be a personal consolation that they were not leaving the community to which
they had always belonged. But at the same time, it might also be the product of feel-
ings of hope—the chance of social and economic mobility in communities that styled
themselves as “better Britains,” consciously seeking to maintain England’s virtues,
while avoiding its mistakes.94 Both these constructions of an expansive British com-
munity were deeply imbued with notions of racial (and gender) difference, but they
were also tied up with the extension abroad of the idea of “home.” They were a
means by which the positive presence identified as self was projected to those far-
flung places in which parts of the self, in the shape of friends and relatives, were in
very real ways located. Both shaped the cultures of empire and their forms of rule.
In this sense, relational British worlds were ways in which real people strove to
91 Ibid., 83.
92 Duncan Bell, “Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought,”Historical Journal
49, no. 1 (March 2006): 297.
93 Froude, quoted in Peter J. Cain, “Empire and the Languages of Character and Virtue in Later Victor-
ian and Edwardian Britain,” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 2 (August 2007): 259.
94 James Belich used the term “better Britains” in Paradise Reforged: AHistory of the New Zealanders, from
the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Albany, NZ, 2001).
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make meaning of their feelings about the new forms of global connectivity.95 In situ-
ations that were often only partially chosen, they were ways of fashioning selves and
lives along the uncertain currents of global trade and migration.
Third, when the 1903 conference participants pointed to the “different complex-
ion” of the various settler universities, they were clear that these institutions were
shaped not only by their local environments but also by the networks of people,
ideas, and practice that connected them to Britain. It was for this reason that
Chase could speak of “traditions which will be modified in the light of experience,
modified indeed, but never abandoned or destroyed.”96 When writing about specific
locations and the life that took place in them, historians of Britain and its many
imperial regions need to consider the ways these local sites and their cultures both
shaped the currents of people and goods, ideas and feelings moving in and out of
them, and were also shaped by them.
In part, this is the question that has underwritten the new imperial history’s exam-
ination of the ways in which imperial networks brought the empire home to Britain.
As Antoinette Burton has argued, the empire was not “out there” but was a “funda-
mental and constitutive part of English culture and national identity at home.”97 But
the imbued nature of specific sites is something with which cultural and human geo-
graphers, urban historians, and historians of science have all, since the 1980s, also
been concerned. This work has seen cities as embedded within the emergent system
of global capitalism—shaped by its transnational structures and interdependencies
as much as by regional and territorial forces.98 Influenced by these shifts, scholars inter-
ested in the sociology of knowledge have turned their attention to the geographies of
science itself.99 They argue that just as urban spaces shape the way people live, so do
sites of inquiry condition the investigations carried out in them. Specific places such as
the laboratory, as well as regional cultures and environments, were instrumental in
forming scientific knowledge, while discreet objects and bodies helped it circulate
95 Tamson Pietsch, “A British Sea: Making Sense of Global Space in the Late Nineteenth Century,”
Journal of Global History 5, no. 3 (November 2010): 430.
96 “Official Report,” 79.
97 Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: On the Inadequacy and the Indispensability of the Nation,” in
After the Imperial Turn: Thinking With and Through the Nation, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham, NC,
2003), 2–3.
98 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, 1991); Saskia Sassen, Cities in a
World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994); Peter J. Taylor,World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis
(London, 2004); Jonathan V. Beaverstock, Richard G. Smith, and Peter J. Taylor, “World City Network: A
NewMetageography?” Annals, Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1 (March 2000), 123–34; Neil
Brenner and Roger Keil, “Editor’s Introduction: Global City Theory in Retrospect and Prospect,” in The
Global Cities Reader, ed. Neil Brenner and Roger Keil (London, 2006), 1–16; Peter J. Taylor, Ben Derud-
der, Pieter Saey, and Frank Witlox, eds., Cities in Globalization: Practices, Policies and Theories (London,
2007), 52–71.
99 Diarmid A. Finnegan, “The Spatial Turn: Geographical Approaches in the History of Science,” Journal
of the History of Biology 41, no. 2 (Summer 2008), 369–88; David N. Livingstone, “The Spaces of Knowl-
edge: Contributions towards a Historical Geography of Science,” Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 13, no. 1 (1995): 5–34; Steven Shapin, “Placing the View fromNowhere: Historical and Sociological
Problems in the Location of Science,”Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 23, no. 1 (April 1998):
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Shaping of Knowledge (Basingstoke, 1998); Charles Withers, Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographi-
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around the globe.100 Closely linked to the idea of networks and questions of trust,
these perspectives have been taken up by historical geographers who have brought
them to bear in their investigations of the British Empire.101 Scholars such has
Gregory Mann have suggested that “the specifics of particular places [need to] be
brought to the fore, not only to ground research empirically but also to disaggregate
and cast new light upon colonial and postcolonial circumstances.”102 Turning to the
local in this way, argues Phillip Howell, facilitates examination of the simultaneously
particular and networked nature of British imperial rule.103
These are concerns evident in Saul Dubow’s examination of science and knowl-
edge in South Africa. By paying attention to the museums, libraries, and scientific
societies established there in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he demon-
strates the ways in which the cultivation of “universal” knowledge in these sites was
used to buttress a version of South African patriotism “that was sufficiently capacious
to reconcile local [English- and Afrikaans-speaking] nationalisms with continued
membership of the British Empire.”104 Central to this “South Africanism” was a
form of scientific racism that underpinned the technonationalism of the apartheid
state. Productive in this way of what we might think of as a “South African”
British world, this locally created knowledge was in turn fed back into the channels
of imperial science, thereby helping to produce another version of the British world
that was defined by race.105 Howwere specific sites—the city, the home, the hospital,
the steamship, the dockyards, or indeed the university and the lecture theatre—shaped
by, and active in shaping, the relational and relative British world spaces we have been
discussing? Historians interested in the sites of imperial rule and in its local cultures—
both in the settler world and outside it—might profitably think about the creation and
consequences of “British world sites” in this double sense: sites produced by imagined
and networked British worlds but also productive of them.
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CONCLUSION
The comments of the delegates at the 1903 Allied Colonial Universities Conference
point to the layered and overlapping set of British worlds they inhabited. Many of the
politicians and university professors who gathered in London had personal experi-
ence of the networks of global commerce and imperial rule that, at the turn of the
twentieth century, were rapidly intensifying. The 1903 delegates’ feelings about
their experiences of this changing world—feelings of dislocation, anxiety, excitement,
and hope—led them to imagine expansive communities defined principally along
lines of race. Tracing migratory routes that stretched between Britain and the
settler colonies, and exchanging privileges with universities in the United
Kingdom, they moved within a world of networks that extended to some places
but not others. Across the empire, they found themselves in institutions that,
although influenced by British models, were shaped by local concerns, funded by
colonial governments, and embedded in particular cultures and communities.
It is as a way of understanding the intersections of these absolute, relative, and rela-
tional worlds that the value of the British worlds concept lies. For by paying attention
to the complex spaces in which people lived—both those shaped by the routes of
long-distance networks and those fashioned by the internal worlds of imagination
—this refashioned notion offers one route into understanding the limited and
unequal landscapes of the globalizing world. These were landscapes that, in the
past as now, certain groups of people were able to navigate more easily than
others. The networks of British trade, the ideational tools of an imagined “global
Britishness,” and the various local enactions of British society were all part of the
material and conceptual apparatus by which large numbers of people sought to
shape Victorian globalization according to their own individual and collective
needs.106
106 J. G. A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands, 181–91.
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